National and Geopolitical Identities and Attitudes to Decommunisation in Dnipro and Kharkiv

There have been few leaders from Kharkiv who had some affect on Ukrainian politics (Vladimir Grynyov, Yevgenii Kushnaryov, Boris Lozhkin). However names of these from Dnipropetrovsk are a lot better identified: Pavlo Lazarenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, Valery Pustovoytenko, Viktor Pinchuk, Ihor Kolomoyskyy (Denis Kazanskyy 2015). Each Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk elites have been defeated within the battle for Ukrainian energy by the Donetsk elite ultimately of 2000s.

In 2014, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk performed essential roles in the course of the so-called ‘Russian spring’. Andrii Portnov (2016), for instance, expresses the favored concept that comparable cities within the East of Ukraine skilled totally different fates as a result of unintended circumstances. Donetsk, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv are comparatively giant, Russian-speaking, oblasts. In his opinion the ‘Russian spring’ failed within the latter two cities due to a particular constellation of native elites’ pursuits and totally different impacts of insurance policies by the central authorities. It’s troublesome to disagree with this, however further arguments could possibly be added. Cities within the Donbas are characterised by the predominance of mining and metallurgy and, consequently, a homogeneous composition of the inhabitants. This contrasts with a diverse vary of industries, together with high-tech that are in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk resulting in a extra various inhabitants which reduces mobilization in the direction of for univocal assist of any political drive or opinion. Solely within the Donbas was a monolithic get together of energy (Occasion of Areas) created; in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk native elites by no means united. From the viewpoint of countering makes an attempt to make town a pro-Russian ‘folks’s republic’ the variety present in Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk was a constructive inhibiting issue (Musiyezdov 2015). Through the Russian-Ukrainian warfare each cities turned essential logistical, medication and navy centres, each accepted giant numbers of IDPs from the Donbas and Kharkiv (for Luhansk) and Dnipropetrovsk (for Donetsk) navy hospitals for wounded troopers.

Basic Attitudes In direction of Decommunisation

How do inhabitants of Kharkiv and Dnipro assess decommunisation? To reply this query, we use the outcomes of surveys carried out in these two cities in 2018.[13]

As we are able to see from desk 7.4, most people in these two cities don’t assist decommunisation however the stage of opposition is increased in Kharkiv than in Dnipro. What can clarify these variations?

The query about identities has already been mentioned earlier in our chapter. We are able to evaluate not solely whole samples from Dnipro and Kharkiv but additionally teams of people that assist decommunisation in each cities[14] (see Desk 7.6). Allow us to discover although that feeling affinity and even belonging to a sure group doesn’t imply an impossibility of feeling affinity or belonging to different teams. That’s the reason some researchers ask to what extent folks think about themselves as consultant of a number of teams (see Musiyezdov 2007). The identical method has been utilized in analysing analysis.

This knowledge gives a number of attention-grabbing observations:

1. Self-identification as European is the one id that correlates with a constructive evaluation of decommunisation; in different phrases, the extra folks really feel they’re European, the extra they assist decommunisation (Spearman coefficient is 0.567 in Kharkiv and 0.370 in Dnipro for the query about streets renaming).
2. Whereas self-identification as Russian may replicate the ethnic specifics of those cities, self-identification as European (which is extra standard in Dnipro) may be very divisive: 29 per cent answered ‘sure’ or ‘reasonably sure’ on this query in Dnipro whereas 22 per cent gave the identical reply in Kharkiv.[15]
3. Feeling European doesn’t correlate (positively or negatively) with different identities.
4. Supporters of decommunisation in Dnipro are a bit bit extra Ukrainian than the inhabitants of Dnipro basically (96 per cent vs. 90 per cent respectively).
5. Supporters of decommunisation in Kharkiv are a bit bit extra Soviet than supporters of decommunisation in Dnipro (34 per cent vs. 19 per cent respectively).

Did European id exist earlier than the 2014 disaster and was it on the similar stage as now? Desk 7.8 exhibits that in each cities the vast majority of those that felt European now felt European earlier than (69 per cent in Dnipro and 78 per cent in Kharkiv). However in comparison with them a major a part of the individuals who assist decommunisation now didn’t really feel European earlier than (52 per cent in Dnipro and 61 per cent in Kharkiv). Which means assist for decommunisation is a response to socio-political occasions reasonably than a results of earlier identification with Europeans.

‘Belonging’ in addition to feeling affinity to a sure group may have totally different meanings. For instance, identification with a rustic may be primarily based on totally different concepts of what a rustic is. Is it a state (political and authorized unity), a ‘Motherland’ (historic unity with some ethnic connotation) or a unity of people that now have one thing in widespread (regardless of why) (Musiyezdov, 2012)? Citizenship and nationality are sometimes confused in Western democracies (for instance, on customs declarations). Subsequently, the clarification of the affect of feeling European on different attitudes should be studied in additional analysis.

Allow us to now transfer on to geopolitical preferences (see Tables 7.8 and seven.9). Right here we are able to see the next outcomes:

1. Supporters of decommunisation are pro-Western.
2. Supporters of decommunisation in Kharkiv are much less radical of their opinions than in Dnipro. Whereas the overall settlement or disagreement is identical in these teams in each cities, inhabitants of Kharkiv extra usually selected ‘reasonably agree’ than ‘completely agree’ than inhabitants of Dnipro.
3. Individuals in Kharkiv are much less pro-European than in Dnipro. 26 per cent in Kharkiv in comparison with 44 per cent in Dnipro agree that Ukraine should defend European values and 32 per cent in Kharkiv in comparison with 42 per cent in Dnipro agree that the affect of Western Europe on the Ukrainian lifestyle is constructive. 55.7 per cent in Kharkiv in comparison with 36.6 per cent in Dnipro don’t see advantages for Ukraine from turning into a member of NATO and the European Union whereas 28.2 per cent in Dnipro in comparison with 11.7 per cent in Kharkiv see such advantages.
4. Even pro-decommunisation teams usually don’t deny their closeness to Slavic peoples in each cities with 74 per cent in Kharkiv and 76 per cent in Dnipro agreeing that Ukraine should defend Slavic values.
5. 81 per cent in Kharkiv in comparison with 69 per cent in Dnipro agree that Russians and Ukrainians are one folks. On the one hand this assertion may be handled for example of these days Russian propaganda that refers to the concept Ukrainians are synthetic building produced by outer forces to weaken Russia. However alternatively, it appears to replicate the Soviet narrative about druzhba narodiv (folks’s friendship) the place cultural and ethnic variations shouldn’t play any vital position.

Variations in attitudes in the direction of Slavic values and Russians between the inhabitants of Kharkiv and Dnipro are attention-grabbing, however we wouldn’t have good explanations for this. It may be assumed that appeals to ‘Slavic values’ and ‘Slavianism’ in any kinds displays the thought and Russian narrative that Russians and Ukrainians are very shut nations (if not as Russian President Vladimir Putin at all times says, ‘one folks’). Maybe it displays the ethnic composition in these cities and/or the existence of long-term border cooperation with Russia in Kharkiv, however this assumption doesn’t appear complete sufficient. Once more, it will be essential to discover what folks imply by NATO, European Union, Slavic values, Russians, and Ukrainians in future analysis.

We’d assume that decommunisation could be supported by those that think about the Soviet interval negatively. In Desk 7.10 we are able to see that this assumption is right with these in favour of decommunisation in each cities viewing the Soviet interval extra negatively than inhabitants within the two cities extra usually. Inhabitants of Dnipro estimate the Soviet interval extra negatively than the inhabitants of Kharkiv among the many inhabitants basically and people in favour of decommunisation teams.

Explanations of the variations between Dnipro and Kharkiv

As we are able to see, basic opinions about decommunisation, geopolitical orientations, identities, and evaluation of Soviet historical past have fairly comparable tendencies in Dnipro and Kharkiv. However regardless of this closeness there are essential variations between two cities: Dnipro seems to be way more pro-Western/pro-European and pro-Ukrainian in addition to much less pro-Soviet than Kharkiv. This isn’t a brand new phenomenon: the analysis ‘The views and opinions of South-Jap areas residents of Ukraine: April 2014’ performed by the Kyiv Worldwide Institute of Sociology have found these variations.[16] They decisively affect attitudes in the direction of decommunisation.

Individuals in each cities are conscious of their variations (Desk 7.11) with 38 per cent in Dnipro agreeing that their metropolis is extra pro-Ukrainian than Kharkiv (28 per cent disagree) and 40 per cent in Kharkiv agreeing with this assertion (12 per cent disagree). How can we clarify the hole in pro-Ukrainian ‘self-confidence’ amongst Dniprovians versus Kharkovians? There could possibly be at the least three assumptions.

First, it may be assumed that these variations are partly primarily based on geography as a result of Kharkiv is a border metropolis and has a higher variety of ties with Russia than Dnipro from which it’s troublesome to flee. It refers to financial connections (Buckholz 2019), identities (Zhurzhenko 2015) and susceptibility to Russian propaganda (Stebelsky 2018; Tomazs Piechal 2015). Since 1991, Kharkiv was compelled to check itself with Kyiv, not with Moscow and Leningrad because it used to do earlier than (Musiyezdov 2016b). Comparability with Kyiv was perceived as new and fairly unfair (Kravchenko 2019). And it led to the enforcement of Soviet nostalgia – the reference to the Soviet interval as to one thing like ‘Golden age’ – that has embodied into the parable of ‘The First capital,’ which was the reference to late Soviet period not the 1920–Nineteen Thirties. Additionally, Kharkiv misplaced its standing because the ‘capital of the East of Ukraine’ with the rise of Donetsk clan within the 2000s which can have elevated frustration and prevented a decline in Soviet nostalgia within the metropolis.

Second, the native historical past and heritage of the Jewish group in Dnipro would possibly matter. Based on the final (2001) census the proportion of Jews is 0.98 per cent (10,503) and 0.77 per cent (11,176) in Dnipro and Kharkiv respectively.[17] In each cities the quantity and proportion of Jews decreased in the course of the Soviet period.

Based on some sources, the Jewish populations of each cities have been nearly equal and lowered from about 8 per cent in 1959 to about 3 per cent in 1989.[18] It may be added that there was a pattern to not displaying Jewish origins within the USSR, particularly when just one dad or mum is a Jew. This makes researchers query Soviet census figures in regards to the variety of Jews. A few of them say that the proportion of Jews needs to be about 10 per cent (Bystriakov 2015). It’s troublesome to show this assertion, however we may agree that the true figures are bigger than official ones.

We are able to see the proportions of Jews in Dnipro and Kharkiv have been very comparable since 1939. However in 1926 the distinction was noticeable; within the 1897 census, there have been 34.77 per cent of Jews in Dnipro[19] and 5.66 per cent in Kharkiv[20] displaying an enormous distinction between them.

This may be defined by the truth that till 1914–1917 Dnipro (then Yekaterinoslav) was part of the Pale of Settlement – the Western territory of Russia Empire the place Jews have been allowed to settle, however Kharkiv was not (Yannay Spitzer 2012). Which means Jews in Dnipro may dwell and keep their conventional tradition. Jews in Kharkiv have been so known as ‘helpful Jews’ – those that have increased training (often docs or engineers) or have been profitable entrepreneurs (have certain quantity of capital). So, they need to really feel lesser connection to Jewish conventional tradition dwelling aside from conventional Jewish group. After 1914, many Jews fled to Kharkiv. Normally, they have been refugees from First World Warfare or fairly poor individuals who sought prosperity outdoors conventional communities. This course of elevated to start with of Soviet period when many Jews who supported Soviet energy got here to Kharkiv because the capital of Soviet Ukraine. This raised the quantity and proportion of Jews in Kharkiv to ranges similar to these of Dnipropetrovsk. However the connection to Jewish custom was totally different in these cities: fairly robust in Dnipropetrovsk[21] and fairly weak in Kharkiv. That’s the reason the Holocaust and Soviet anti-Semitism had higher affect on Jews in Dnipropetrovsk than in Kharkiv and shaped the scenario the place Jews in Dnipro ‘maintain no nostalgia for the USSR’ (see the chapter by Ishchenko) whereas Jews in Kharkiv ought to have such a nostalgia.

Third, the position of native elites needs to be considered. The variety of leaders from Dnipropetrovsk who rose to prominence nationally (Leolid Kuchma, Pavlo Lazarenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, Valery Pustovoytenko) may give the impression that Ukraine ‘belongs to them,’ which means that they’ve their political and financial pursuits tied with Ukraine and inside Ukraine. The Kharkiv authorities, alternatively, have been much less concerned in Ukrainian politics and extra linked with Russia, at the least economically. Dnipro elites noticed the occasions of 2013–2014 and the Russo-Ukrainian warfare as a possibility to regain their management of Ukraine after years of ‘Donetsk clan’ dominance (Buckholz 2019; Kuzio 2019, Portnov 2015b).

Additionally, the Jewish oligarchs from Dnipro (Viktor Pinchuk, Ihor Kolomoyskyy) are a lot nearer tied to Jewish traditions and to the anti-Soviet perspective of Jews in Dnipro than are Kharkiv’s elites of Jewish ancestry (Gennadii Kernes, Mykhaylo Dobkin).[22] This additionally ought to situation corresponding coverage decisions in these cities, together with on decommunisation.

Some Basic Assumptions

A ‘Soviet’ individual wouldn’t be in opposition to the Soviet legacy however in circumstances when most individuals with a Soviet id even have a Ukrainian id, one should ask what precisely it means to be/to really feel Soviet? Solutions on this query could possibly be a real predictor of the perspective in the direction of decommunisation. We don’t have correct devices to get this reply to this point, however we attempt to make just a few preliminary solutions.

First, we are able to assume there are 5 totally different ‘dimensions’ of perceiving Soviet id:

1. Political: correspondence to sure political beliefs (communist, socialist, left).
2. Financial: correspondence to sure financial views (‘truthful’ distribution system and the extent of its embodiment within the USSR actuality, particularly).
3. Cultural: correspondence to the Russian or Russian-speaking literature.
4. Historic: correspondence to the sure interpretation(s) of historical past,
5. Biographical: correspondence to the very fact of the one’s delivery within the USSR or acknowledgement of habits and attitudes as Soviet.

Maybe it’s potential so as to add another dimensions; every of them may have totally different interpretations. However all of them are ‘doctrinal’, ‘cognitive’, ‘discursive’ ones which suggests they relate to some rational and aware statements whereas in lots of instances the emotional component is way more essential. On this context, the idea of nostalgia appears productive as a result of it covers attitudes in the direction of the previous via the prism of collective reminiscence and private expertise, and is linked to identities, values and interpretations of the current, which all embody an emotional element.

Within the case of Soviet nostalgia, it will be helpful to make use of the excellence on ‘smooth’ and ‘onerous’ nostalgia. ‘Onerous nostalgia’ is espoused by Russian President Vladimir Putin: ‘The collapse of the USSR was the best geopolitical disaster of the 20^th century’. ‘Comfortable nostalgia’ is revealed within the settlement with then Socialist Occasion of Ukraine chief Oleksandr Moroz’s assertion: ‘You don’t have any coronary heart in the event you don’t remorse for the loss the USSR, however you will have no head if you’d like the USSR revived.’[23] This assertion stems from the late Nineties and was made to mark the distinction between the Socialist Occasion and the Communist Occasion. These days ‘smooth nostalgia’ could be current amongst these with Ukrainian and European identities, however ‘onerous nostalgia’ (in all probability) is just not. ‘Comfortable nostalgia’ may clarify among the reasonably passive opposition to decommunisation (which we are able to observe) whereas ‘onerous nostalgia’ seemingly motivates anti-decommunisation activists.

This distinction echoes Svetlana Boym’s (2002) distinction between ‘restorative’ and ‘reflective’ nostalgia. For her, ‘restorative’ nostalgia entails the idealisation of the article of nostalgia, whereas ‘reflective’ nostalgia allows some interpretation of and emotions for the previous and its relation to the current – with out the expectation or need to going again.

Conclusions

Regardless of holding pro-Western/pro-European positions and a destructive view of Soviet historical past, supporters of decommunisation don’t deny their Soviet previous fully; certainly, a lot of them proceed to really feel Soviet, think about Russians and Ukrainians to be one folks and have a tendency to assist Slavic values. Then again, disapproval of decommunisation could possibly be defined by pragmatic causes than by ideological components.

Variations between Dnipro and Kharkiv are generally fairly vital. Normally, inhabitants of Dnipro assist decommunisation extra, are extra pro-Western/pro-European and extra pro-Ukrainian and are much less pro-Soviet. These variations don’t deny comparable opinions in each cities, however they do however matter. It may be assumed that these variations are primarily based on geography and whether or not town is a border metropolis, which impacts financial ties, identities and susceptibilities to Russian disinformation. Two different components are the position and native historical past of the Jewish group in Dnipro (see above) and the position of native elites in Ukrainian politics and financial system.

Since identification is extraordinarily delicate to the meanings that are concerned within the processes[24] an intensive research of those meanings needs to be a part of any analysis into id. This chapter contributes to the research of decommunisation and identities by offering new floor in evaluating Kharkiv and Dnipro and by pointing to the necessity for additional analysis.

Notes

[1] See Legislation no. 2558 (April 2015)‘On Condemning the Communist and Nationwide Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes and Prohibiting the Propagation of their Symbols’, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/legal guidelines/present/317-19#Textual content

[2] We thank Anna Olinyk and Taras Kuzio for this info.

[3] ‘Za roky decommunizatsii v Ukrayini demontuvaly bilsh yak 1300 pamyatnykiv Leninu’ Ukrinform, 16 July 2020. https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3064494-za-roki-dekomunizacii-v-ukraini-demontuvali-bils-ak-1300-pamatnikiv-leninu.html

[4] ‘Perspective towards sure historic figures and decommunisation course of in Ukraine,’ Sociological Group ‘Ranking’, 17 November 2016. http://ratinggroup.ua/en/analysis/ukraine/otnoshenie_k_otdelnym_istoricheskim_lichnostyam_i_processu_dekommunizacii_v_ukraine.html

[5] ‘The sixth yr of decommunisation: the perspective of Ukrainians towards prohibition of symbols of the totalitarian previous,’ Democratic Initiatives Basis, 24 July 2020. https://dif.org.ua/en/article/the-sixth-year-of-decommunisation-the-attitude-of-ukrainians-toward-prohibition-of-symbols-of-the-totalitarian-past

[6] Within the annual ‘Ukrainian society’ monitoring of public opinion since 1992 by the Institute of Sociology of the Nationwide Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the query is formulated as ‘Who do you think about your self within the first place?’ with the next choices for solutions (Vorona and Shulha 2018, 465).

[7] ‘Social and political moods of Ukrainians: IRI ballot,’ Sociological group ‘Ranking’, 10 July 2019. http://ratinggroup.ua/en/analysis/ukraine/opros_iri_dinamika_obschestvenno-politicheskih_vzglyadov_v_ukraine_iyun_2019.html

[8] ‘Chyselnist naiavnoho naselennia m.Dnipra na 1 serpnia 2020 roku,’ Holovne upravlinnya statystyky Dnipropetrovskoi oblasti.  http://www.dneprstat.gov.ua/expres/2020/09/21_09_2020/chis-nas-mDnipra.pdf

[9] ‘Chyselnist naiavnoho naselennya m.Dnipra na 1 serpnya 2020 roku,’ Databank of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine. http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/MULT/Database/Census/databasetree_uk.asp

[10] ‘Chyselnist naselennya (za otsinkoyu) po mistakh oblasnoho znachennya ta rayonakh,’ (shchomisyachna informatsiya). http://kh.ukrstat.gov.ua/chyselnist-naselennia-shchomisiachna-informatsiia

[11] Databank of State Statistics Service of Ukraine. http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/MULT/Database/Census/databasetree_uk.asp

[12] This viewpoint relies on our private observations dwelling in Kharkiv and attending conferences of individuals from Kharkiv and Donetsk.

[13] This research relies on two pattern surveys performed among the many grownup (18+) inhabitants in Dnipro (n = 1258) and Kharkiv (n =1254) in early and mid-2018, respectively. The surveys have been designed by Michael Gentile and the fieldwork and sampling have been performed on a contractual foundation by the Centre for Social Indicators (CSI), whose discipline sources and experience are shared with the reputed Kyiv Worldwide Institute of Sociology (KIIS) polling company. Funding from the Norwegian Analysis Council (NORRUSS venture 287267, ‘Ukrainian Geopolitical Fault-line Cities: City Identification, Geopolitics and City Coverage’) supported this work. The info assortment effort was funded by the Division of Sociology and Human Geography on the College of Oslo through a Småforsk grant given to Michael Gentile.

[14] Individuals who ‘completely assist’ or ‘reasonably assist’ the renaming of streets. The query in regards to the removing of Lenin monuments has a obscure choice (‘they need to be moved to a different place’) which could possibly be interpreted for or in opposition to ‘decommunisation’ relying on the context.

[15] Right here and different emphasised variations are 0tatistically vital on the 1%-level.

[16] ‘The views and opinions of south-eastern areas residents of Ukraine: April 2014,’ Kyiv Worldwide Institute of Sociology, April 2014. http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reviews&id=302&y=2014&m=4&web page=1 

[17] Databank of State Statistics Service of Ukraine. http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/MULT/Database/Census/databasetree_uk.asp

[18] ‘Elektronnaya yevreyskaya enciklopediya,’ Dnipro. https://eleven.co.il/diaspora/communities/11444/; Kharkiv. Elektronnaya yevreyskaya enciklopediya. https://eleven.co.il/diaspora/communities/14456/. See additionally Demoscope Weekly. http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/pril.php

[19] ‘The First Basic Census of the Russian Empire of 1897. Breakdown of inhabitants by mom tongue and districts in 50 Gubernia of European Russia. Yekaterinislav district – town of Yekaterinislav,’ Demoscope Weekly. http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_lan_97_uezd_eng.php?reg=426

[20] ‘The First Basic Census of the Russian Empire of 1897. Breakdown of inhabitants by mom tongue and districts in 50 Gubernia of European Russia. Kharkov district – town of Kharkov,’ Demoscope Weekly. http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_lan_97_uezd_eng.php?reg=1604

[21] Particularly, the Seventh Lubavitcher Rebbe, Menachem Mendel Schneerson (1902–1994), grew up in Dnipropetrovsk which is why town was particularly essential for the Hasidic custom. See the chapter by Ishchenko.

[22] For instance, Gennadii Kernes thought-about himself an Orthodox Christian and his funeral service occurred in an Orthodox Church. See ‘U Kharkovi poproschalysya z Kernesom: usi podrobytsi,’ Obozrevatel. https://information.obozrevatel.com/ukr/politics/u-harkovi-proschayutsya-z-kernesom-vsi-podrobitsi-onlajn.htm). Mykhailo Dobkin is a founding father of the Occasion of Christian Socialists. See ‘Dobkin Mykhaylo Markovych. Vidkrytyi reyiestr natsionalnyh publichnyh diyiachiv Ukrayiny.’ https://pep.org.ua/uk/individual/388.

[23] ‘Politychna biografiya Oleksandra Moroza,’ Radio Svoboda. https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/947905.html

[24] What teams or different patterns are? Why they’re what they’re? How are they interpreted and by whom? What are the similarities and variations between their positions?

References

Abramov, Roman. (2014). ‘Vremia i prostranstvo nostalgii’. Sotsiologicheskiy Zhurnal, 4: 5–23.

Baumann, Zygmunt (2001) The Individualized Society. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Baumeister, Roy. (1986). Identification. Cultural Change and Wrestle for Self. N. Y., Oxford.

Boiko, Natalia et al., (1998). Pravliacha elita Ukrainy. Analitychna dopovid N10 (Kyiv: Instytut sotsiolohii NAN Ukrayiny).

Bourdieu, Pierre. (1990). In Different Phrases: Essays towards a Reflective Sociology Stanford College Press.

Boym, Svetlana. (2002). The Way forward for Nostalgia. New York: Fundamental Books.

Brubaker, Rogers. (2002). ‘Ethnicity with out teams,’ European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes De Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv Für Soziologie, 43, 2: 163–189.

Bystriakov, Aleksandr (2015). ‘Khronika zhyzni evreiev Yekaterinoslava – Dnepropetrovska’ In: Almanac ‘Yevreiskaya starina,’ 2 (85). http://berkovich-zametki.com/2015/Starina/Nomer2/Bystrjakov1.php

Buckholz, Quentin. (2019). ‘The Canines That Didn’t Bark. Elite Preferences and the Failure of Separatism in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk,’ Issues of Publish-Communism, 66, 3: 151–160.

Castells, Manuel. (1997). The The Energy of Identification, The Info Age: Financial system, Society and Tradition, Vol. II Cambridge, MA; Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Chornyy, Dmytro. (2007). Po livyy bik Dnipra: downside modernizatsii mist Ukrayiny (kinets XIX – pochatok XX st.) Kharkiv: Kharkiv Nationwide College.

Gentile, Michael (2020) ‘Diabolical Strategies: Disinformation and the Curious Scale of Nationalism in Ukrainian Geopolitical Fault-line Cities,’ Geopolitics, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2020.1830766.

Giddens, Antony. (1991). Modernity and Self-Identification. Self and Society within the Late Fashionable Age. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, Antony. (1984). The Structure of Society. Define of the Concept of Structuration Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hayday, Oleksandra. (2018) Kamyanyy hist. Pamyatnyky Leninu v Tsentralniy Ukrayini. Kyiv, Okay.I.S.

Hromenko, Serhii. (2019) ‘Dekomunizatsiya. Deradyanizatsiya? Dekolonizatsiya!’ Lokalna Istoriya, 11 December. http://localhistory.org.ua/dekomunizatsiya-deradyanizatsiya-dekolonizatsiya-5-rokiv-pereosmyslennya-radyanskoyi-symvoliky/

Kachanov, Yuri and Shmatko, Natalia. (1996). ‘Kak vozmozhna sotsial’naya gruppa? (ok probleme actual’nosti v sotsiologii),’ Sotsiologicheskiye Issledovaniya, 12, 90–105.

Kazanskyy, Denys. (2015). ‘Susidski viyny,’ Ukrayinsky Tyzhden, 11 October 2015. https://tyzhden.ua/Politics/147621

Kravchenko, Volodymyr. (2019). ‘Kharkiv: The Previous Lives On’, The Soviet and Publish-Soviet Evaluation, 46, 3: 324–351.

Kurina, Aksiniia. (2016). ‘Istoryk Georgii Kasianov: Sposoby zdiysnennia dekomunizatsii nagaduiut’ komunistychni praktyky,’ Ukrayinska Pravda. Zhyttya, 7 Could. https://life.pravda.com.ua/society/2016/05/7/211912/

Kuzio, Taras. (2019). Viyna Putina Proty Ukrayiny. Revolutsiya, Natsionalism, I Kriminalitet Kyiv: Dukh i litera.

Marples, David. (2015). ‘Open Letter from Students and Specialists on Ukraine Re. the So-Known as ‘Anti-Communist Legislation,’ Krytyka, April. https://krytyka.com/en/articles/open-letter-scholars-and-experts-ukraine-re-so-called-anti-communist-law

Musiyezdov, Oleksiy. (2007). ‘V poshukah regionalnoi identychnosti (na prykladi doslidzhen studentiv-pershokursnykiv kharkivskyh vnz),’Visnyk Lvivskoho Universytetu. Seriya Sotsiologichna, 1, 11–21.

Musiyezdov, Oleksiy. (2012). ‘Uyavlennia professional krayinu yak osnova hromadyanskoi identychnosti’ In: Arbenina, Vera and Sokurianska, Ludmyla eds. Ukrainske studentstvo u poshukah identychnosti. Kharkiv: Kharkiv Nationwide College, 69–80.

Musiyezdov, Oleksiy. (2015). ‘Multikulturnost goroda v globalnom obschestve: Primer Kharkova,’ In: Metodologiya, teoriya ta praktyka sotsiologichnogo analizu suchasnoho suspilstva: Zbirnyk naukovyh prats. Kharkiv: Kharkiv Nationwide College, 167–173.

Musiyezdov, Oleksiy. (2016a). ‘Identychnosti vs. Tsinnosti: Scho naspravdi poyasnuye Yevromaidan,’ Ukrayina Moderna, 2 March. http://uamoderna.com/blogy/oleksi-musiezdov/identychnosti-vs-cinnosti

Musiyezdov, Oleksiy. (2016b). Miska identicnist u (publish)suchasnomu suspilstvi: ukrayinskyy dosvid. Kharkiv: Kharkiv Nationwide College.

Nitsova, Silviya (2021) ‘Why the Distinction? Donbas, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk After Ukraine’s Euromaidan Revolution,’ Europe-Asia Research, DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2021.1912297.

Piechal, Tomasz. (2015). ‘The Kharkiv oblast: a fragile stability,’ OSW Commentary, 6 September. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-06-09/kharkiv-oblast-a-fragile-stability

Portnov, Andriy. (2015a). ‘On Decommunisation, Identification, and Legislating Historical past, From a Barely Totally different Angle,’ Krytyka, Could. https://krytyka.com/en/options/opinions/decommunisation-identity-and-legislating-history-slightly-different-angle

Portnov, Andriy. (2015b). ‘The Coronary heart of Ukraine’? Dnipropetrovsk and the Ukrainian Revolution’ In: Wilson, Andrew ed. What does Ukraine suppose. London: European Council on International Relations, 62–70.

Portnov, Andriy. (2016). ‘How ‘japanese Ukraine’ was misplaced,’ OpenDemocracy, 14 January. https://www.opendemocracy.internet/en/odr/how-eastern-ukraine-was-lost/

Portnova, Tetiana. (2012). ‘Evolutsiya miskoho seredovyscha Katerynoslava kintsya XIX – pochatku XX st.,’ Historians.in.ua, 20 February 2012. http://www.historians.in.ua/index.php/en/doslidzhennya/144-tetiana-portnova-evolyutsiya-miskoho-ser

Portnova, Tetiana. (2017). ‘Tema ‘zakrytoho mista v istorii radyanskoho Dniproprtrovska 1950-80-h rokiv,’ Historians.in.ua, 11 December. http://www.historians.in.ua/index.php/en/doslidzhennya/2351-tetyana-portnova-tema-zakritogo-mista-v-istoriji-radyanskogo-dnipropetrovska-1950-80-kh-rokiv

Shevel, Oxana. (2016). ‘Decommunisation in Publish-Euromaidan Ukraine. Legislation and follow,’ PONARS Eurasia Coverage Memos, 411. http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/decommunisation-post-euromaidan-ukraine-law-and-practice

Solodko, Pavlo. (2012). ‘Dnipropetrovsk. Yak opovisty istoriyu mista bez istorii,’ Istorychna Pravda, 26 January. https://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2012/01/26/70102/

Stebelsky, Ihor. (2018). ‘A story of two areas: geopolitics, identities, narratives, and battle in Kharkiv and the Donbas,’ Eurasian Geography and Economics, 59, 1: 28–50.

Spitzer, Yannay. (2012). ‘A New Map of Jewish Communities within the Russian Empire,’ Yannay Spitzer. Bits and Items of My Work and Pursuits. 22 July. https://yannayspitzer.internet/2012/07/22/a-new-map-of-jewish-communities-in-the-russian-empire/

Ukrainian Parliament. (2015).‘Legislation On Condemning the Communist and Nationwide Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes and Prohibiting the Propagation of their Symbols.’ https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/legal guidelines/present/317-19#Textual content

Vorona, Valerii and Shulha, Mykola eds. (2018). Ukrayinske suspilstvo: monitorynh sotsiyalnykh zmin, 6 (20). Kyiv: Instytut sotsiolohii NAN Ukrainy.

Yavorskyy, Volodymyr. (2015). ‘Analiz zakonu professional zaboronu komunistychnyh symvoliv,’ Prava ludyny v Ukrayini. Informatsiynyy portal Kharkivskoi pravozahysnoyi hrupy, 1 Could. http://khpg.org/index.php?id=1430493970

Zhuk, Sergei, (2010). Rock and Roll within the Rocket Metropolis: The West, Identification, and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk, 1960–1985. Washington DC and Baltimore, ML: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press and Johns Hopkins College Press.

Zhurzhenko, Tatiana. (2015). ‘Ukraine’s Jap Borderlands: The top of ambiguity?’ In: Andrew Wilson ed. What does Ukraine suppose. London: European Council on International Relations, 45–52.

Zhurzhenko, T. (2017). ‘The making and unmaking of revolutions. What 1917 means for Ukraine, in gentle of the Maidan,’ Eurozine, 30 November. https://www.eurozine.com/the-making-and-unmaking-of-revolutions/

Additional Studying on E-Worldwide Relations